This paper determines the effect of ownership structure, governance mechanisms, and legal systems on long term operating performance of acquiring firms in emerging countries. The current work investigates the performance of sixty-nine merger and acquisition deals in emerging market countries. The major finding is that the acquiring firms with controlling shareholders (especially holding ownership between 25%-30%) improve post acquisition operating performance over three years after transaction. Board composition indexes for acquiring firms in emerging countries are more influential to post acquisition performance than those of CEO position and block-holders. Value creating deals associate with higher quality accounting standards and superior investor protection of emerging market countries. Too strong legal enforcement seemingly leads to greater value destruction, and legal origin has a varying influence on corporate performance. However, significant superior investment performance does not exist in acquiring firms from emerging countries classified as English legal origin but in those classified as German legal origin.
Introduction
One of the most important drivers of corporate performance in the past twenty years is the level of merger and acquisition (M&A) activities companies are involved in. The 1990s merger wave peaked in 2000 encompassed mega-deals, globalization, and consolidation in telecommunications, media, and technology (TMT) industries. Companies invested billions of dollars making acquisitions but most empirical studies show that shareholders of acquiring firms experienced significant loss on average, or at best broke even (Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandelker 1992, Goergen and Renneboog 2004) . The lessons of this wave not only moved academics to investigate factors leading to value reduction, but also gave rise to the revolution in corporate governance among companies worldwide, a topic that continues today.
Data supplied by Thomson Financial (TOB) indicate that the pace of the recent merger wave has been gradually recovering and strengthening since 2002. A significant aspect of this trend has been the rapid growth of Asian M&A transactions with a non-large amount deals value. Relying on the fast-growing economy as well as price jumping in energy and commodities, companies in emerging markets not confined to the Asia-Pacific region have been accumulating considerable capital funds in recent years. With strong financial resources and broad domestic markets, these emerging market businesses have not only consolidated domestic enterprises to gain size advantage, but also attempted to make a giant leap forward in Europe and the United States market by conducting global M&As. Although the motives of these emerging market enterprises are different from those in traditional M&A activities, emerging competitors in the near future will present a potential threat to companies in developed countries and change the face of the world economy.
A recent leading work by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999) points out that one or two shareholders who own a large percentage of the firm's shares control most public corporations worldwide.
Especially in emerging market countries, a particular family often controls corporations and listed companies. Controlling owners may have more incentive to maximize firm value because firm performance closely links to their welfare Meckling 1976, Shleifer and Vishny 1986) .But when owners cannot separate their own financial preference from those of minority shareholders, they have more power to act on their own interest at the expense of firm performance through specific corporate decisions (La Porta et al. 1999, Claessens, Djankov and Lang 2000) .
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Prior studies focusing on the relationship between ownership and firm performance show that firm value increases with ownership of the largest shareholders (McConaughy, Walker, Henderson and Mishra 1998 , Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang 2002 , La Porta, Lopez-deSilanes, Shleifer and Vishny 2002 , Anderson and Reeb 2003 . In contrast, other studies suggest that without effective monitoring, controlling shareholders are likely to exploit minority shareholders and make sub-optimal decisions when control rights exceed cash flow rights (Faccio, Lang and Young 2001, Cronqvist and Nilsson 2003) . Many studies also suggest that the relationship may not be linear (Anderson and Reeb 2003 , Morck, Shleifer and Vishny 1988 , McConnell and Servaes 1990 . Another branch of ownership research centers on separation problems which indicate that controlling shareholders often have greater control rights than cash flow rights because of pyramidal structures, cross-holdings, dual class shares, and various other control devices (La Porta et al. 1999 , Claessens et al. 2000 . This separation provides an a better legal environment may not be in a position to expropriate minority shareholders via M&A deals but may make sub-optimal investment decisions to reduce their own risks (Holmen and Knopf 2004 , Ben-Amar and André 2006 , Faccio and Stolin 2006 . Yen and Andr´e (2007) study found that, even in English origin countries, ownership structure has impact (non-linear relationship) on operating performance of acquiring firms. Individual governance mechanisms and legal systems are still important determinants of acquisition performance in countries with English legal origin, assumed to have a better investor protection system. This paper joins the ongoing debate by investigating the effects of concentrated ownership, governance mechanisms, and legal protection on corporate performance of acquiring firms. This work extends the research of Yen and Andr´e (2007) by examining acquiring firms in emerging market countries. Referring to arguments that short term market performance may not fully capture anticipated benefits from an acquisition (Hitt, Harrison, Ireland and Best 1998) , this paper follows the work of Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992) and takes long term operating cash flows as performance measures to examine M&A value creation.
Based on a sample of sixty-nine deals over 1998-2004 in thirteen emerging countries including English, German, and French legal origins, we find that acquiring firms with controlling shareholders (especially holding ownership between 25%-30%) improve post acquisition operating performance over three years after transaction. Board composition indexes for acquiring firms in emerging countries are more influential to post acquisition performance than CEO positions and block-holders.
Value creating deals associate with higher quality accounting standards and superior investor protection of emerging markets. Too strong legal enforcement seemingly leads to greater value destruction, and legal origin has varying influence on corporate performance. However, significant superior investment performance does not exist in acquiring firms from emerging countries classified with English legal origin but in those classified with German legal origin.
Literature Review
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Comparing to the wide discussion about corporate governance mechanisms on general firm performance, there is relatively scarce theoretical or empirical research to provide evidence on the relationship between governance mechanisms and specific acquisition performance. One stream of governance researchers proved the incentive effect by showing that increasing insiders' ownership has positive effect on acquirers' returns (Lewellen, Loderer and Rosenfeld 1985, Carline, Linn and Yadav 2002) . However, the other stream of governance researchers has argued that majority shareholders, have stronger power to expropriate minority shareholders via M&A events, especially when they can opportunity for controlling shareholders to expropriate minority shareholders and therefore has a significantly negative effect on firm performance (Claessens et al. 2000 , La Porta et al. 2002 , Faccio and Lang 2002 , Cronqvist and Nilsson 2003 .
Based on the costs of concentrated ownership, governance research has generally examined the following mitigating factors. The first one is board structure. Academics, regulators, and shareholder activists generally suggest the size of the board (not too large and not too small) and separating the CEO/COB position leads to better governance (Rosenstein and Wyatt 1990 , Weisbach 1988 , Vefeas and Theodorou 1998 , Brickley, Coles and Jarrell 1997 . The second factor is CEO position. Whether an individual who is the dominant shareholder should occupy the seat of CEO is still debatable. Anderson and Reeb (2003) suggested that with effective outside monitors, family CEOs might provide essential firm-specific expertise and reduce agency problems. Many researchers, however, offer a different view: dominant CEOs may more easily entrench themselves and thus deviate from firm value maximization (Sharma and Ho 2002, Barth, Gulbrandsen and Schonea 2005) . The third factor relates to other large shareholders. Large block holders such as institutional investors, have the means to monitor and influence the controlling shareholder (André, Kooli and L'Her 2004) . Maury and Pajuste (2005) showed that not only the presence, but also the equal distribution of voting shares among block holders, has positive effect on firm value.
Recent papers have emphasized the importance of legal institutions in protecting investors and limiting self-dealing by controlling shareholders. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (LLSV, 1998) formed an anti-director rights index to measure the level of shareholder rights and concluded that the average anti-director right index in English origin countries is significantly better than that in the other countries with different legal origins. Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (DLLS, 2006) further presented a new measure of legal protection in their working paper: the anti-self-dealing index. Yen and Andr´e (2007) tested these two legal indexes on the operating performance of acquiring firms in countries with an English origin legal system. They found that acquiring firms in countries with a higher revised anti-director right index do have better performance, but failed to prove the expected effect for the anti-self dealing index.
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Wu and Chen (2007) studied the effects of corporate governance and agency problems on the performance of acquiring firms, by employing 174 corporations from listed companies in Taiwan, which announced a merger or acquisition between 1992 and 2002. They tested short-term announcement effect by calculating AR/ CAR at the time of acquisition announcement and examined long-term operating performance using accounting measures such as ROA, ROE, EPS, Tobin's Q, and so on. Their results showed declining operation performance of acquiring firms after the merger. However, Wu and Chen (2002) only focused on the Taiwan market, and used accrual based accounting ratios, easily manipulated and affected by accounting method. (2006) showed that family controlled firms with a family member as CEO have positive impact on abnormal market returns at the announcement date. They proved the expected positive relationship between block-holder ownership and the announcement date returns of acquiring firms, but documented a negative association between board size and abnormal returns of acquiring firms. Sudarsanam and Mahate (2006) found that acquiring firms with COE-COB duality problems have weakly negative three-year post-acquisition value creation. Researchers have paid even less attention to examine the effects of legal and extra-legal mechanisms on acquisition performance. Rossi and Volpin (2004) examined M&A determinants by focusing on legal institution differences. Their main findings showed that acquirers from countries with better investor protection do not pay a higher premium than acquirers do from countries with weaker investor protection. This provides evidence that a higher premium in countries with better protection is not a proxy of private benefits.
Researches regarding the effects of ownership, governance mechanisms, and legal/ extralegal Flanagan, Milman and D'Mello (1997) examined Latin American M&A activities in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Venezuela and compared these activities with those in the United States. They found that differences of M&A activity exist not only between Latin American countries and the United States, but also among various Latin American countries. Bae et al. (2002) presented a comparable research with this paper, but they tested the traditional market based abnormal returns and focused only on a single country, Korea. Implications for emerging markets and operating performance measures in need of additional research are discussed. 8
Data and Research Methodology
Sample Selection
The data set of this project was obtained from the Thomson Financial Securities Data's SDC Table 1>> 3.2 Variables
Dependent Variable
Performance Measure
Based on Healy et al. (1992) , this paper used pre-tax operating cash flow (OCF) to measure acquisition performance and defined operating cash flow as operating income after depreciation plus depreciation and goodwill amortization, i.e. EBITDA. This definition ensures that performance measure is unaffected by different merger accounting methods, tax policy, or the type of financing used to fund the acquisition. Operating cash flow return (OCFR) is calculated as operating cash flow divided by market value of asset.
Operating cash flow returns are computed for each company up to three years before and after the acquisition event. Pre-acquisition performance is calculated as a weighted-average of the 9 operating cash flow rate for the bidder and the target. The weights are based on the market values of assets of both companies the year before acquisition. The median of OCFR three years before and after acquisition (MEGpre and MEGpost) is used. This measurement is consistent with that of Healy et al. (1992 and 1997) and Ghosh (2001) . Following Ghosh's (2001) critique of Healy et al. (1992) , we set the criteria to select a list of matched firms based on size, industry, and pre-performance. After setting the list of matched firms, the steps for calculating operating cash flows are repeated to obtain operating cash flow rates for the pair of matched firms (a match for the bidder and a match for the target). Since the pair of matched firms forms the benchmark, both pre and post-acquisition performances (MATpre and MATpost) are also measured as the weighted-average of the operating cash flow returns based on the market values of bidder and target assets the year before acquisition.
The industry, size, and pre-performance adjusted operating cash flow return (ACFR) is the operating cash flow return of the merging firm minus that of the matched pair of firm. Similar to Healy et al. (1992) , the median of ACFR three years before and after acquisition (ACFRpre and ACFRpost) is calculated and the post performance (ACFRpost) is examined as our major performance metric (Loughran and Ritter 1997 , Linn and Switzer 2001 , Rahman and Limmack 2004 , Powell and Stark 2005 2 .
Performance Benchmark
Following Barber and Lyon (1996) , most researchers adopt industry, size, and preperformance based matching. For example, Loughran and Ritter (1997) chose their matched firms using the following criteria: 1) 2-digit SIC, assets within 25%-200%, closest EBITDA/assets and 2) if there was no match, assets within 90%-110%, closest but higher EBITDA/assets. In Ghosh (2001), firms were matched by the same 2-digit SIC code, total assets between 25% and 200%, and the closest ratio of operating cash flow to market value of assets (sales). Powell and Stark (2005) selected their matched firms with an initial size filter between 25% and 200% within the bidder and target industries. To make our results comparable with previous studies, our matching procedure is consistent with the recommendations of Barber and Lyon (1996) and similar to the approaches employed by Ghosh (2001) and Loughran and Ritter (1997) .
We constructed our benchmarks with the following initial criteria: 1) the same 2-digit primary SIC code; 2) similar size, measured as book value of assets within 70% and 130% one year before takeover; 3) similar pre-performance, measured as return on asset (ROA) within 90% 2 Some papers calculate the change in cash flow returns (ΔACFR) to examine performance improvement (Ghosh 2001 , Carline et al. 2002 , Rahman and Limmack 2004 . ΔACFR defined as ACFRpost minus ACFRpre aims to decipher the covariance stationary. We controlled this problem by exercising the unit root (Augmented DickeyFuller, ADF) test on ACFRpost. The test results reject the null hypothesis at the 1% level. This means the ACFRpost series does not have a unit root problem and the series is a stationary series. Therefore, we only used the change performance (ΔACFR), not reported, for the robustness test.
and 110% one year before takeover. 4) The same nation code as the bidder and the target. From the list of potential matched firms, we selected the firm with the closest but highest ROA. If there was no match, the pre-performance restriction was extended by choosing a matching firm with ROA between 50% and 150%. If no firm met the criteria, this study selected the firms also in emerging countries instead of the firms in the same country and reset the pre-performance limit to 90%-110%. If the first run criteria were too strict to give a matching firm, we performed a second run with larger bands. That is, the same 2-digit primary SIC code, book value of assets within 25% and 200%, ROA between 90% and 110%, and the same country. After the second run, we obtained 87% matching for acquiring firms and 76% for target firms. For the few cases without a match at this point, we selected the firm with the closest ROA within size band and industry.
Finally, statistical analysis showed that our original operating cash flow data of both merged and matched firms had heavy tailed distributions. We used Huber's M-estimator 3 with k=1.28 to estimate the measure of location and detect the outliers, and then winsorized the data. 
Independent Variables
Independent variables in this project were primarily grouped into four categories: ownership variables; governance variables; legal variables and typical deal variables. Country variables were set to control the country effects. Table 2 illustrates the detailed definition of each variable. The coding approach for ownership variables is similar to prior research Lang 2002, Yen and Andr´e 2007) . This study included seven dummy ownership variables reflecting different voting share thresholds held by the largest shareholder. The first dummy variable (OWN10) was for companies having a large shareholder holding more than 10% of the voting shares. Studies have broadly used the 10% level as a cut point to test the difference between dispersed and concentrated ownership structures because it provides a significant stake and most countries mandate disclosure at this level or lower (La Porta et al. 1998 , Faccio et al. 2001 ).
The second dummy variable (OWN20) was set for companies whose large shareholder holding was more than 20% of voting shares because some literature has argued that 20% might be a better cut-off point to define ownership concentration (Demsetz and Lehn 1985 , La Porta et al. 1999 , Claessens et al. 2000 , Faccio et al. 2001 ). Furthermore, consider that when a large
3 M-estimators are highly recommended due to higher breakdown points than the mean and more accurate variance than the median from a normal distribution or trimmed means from a heavy tailed probability curve. M-estimators play a more dominant role when dealing with regression analysis issues (Wilcox 2001). For the M-estimators, the idea of flexibility of trimming ratio is introduced by equation (1) where any observed value X is declared an outlier based on the sample median, M and the median absolute deviation, MAD.
(
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This study used a well-known M-estimator called one-step M-estimator, which has been broadly applied using K=1.28 (Huber 1964). 4 The average level of winsorising for right tails is 16.95%, 7.04% for left tails 11
These findings demonstrate that merged firms in the study sample are competitive with the benchmark firms before M&As and especially outperform in the last year before transactions.
This result coincides with prior studies (Healy et al. 1992 , Ghosh 2001 ) but contradicts Yen and Andr´e (2007) , which sample firms from English origin countries. Compared to their rivals, while the acquiring firms in our sample lose their superiority right after M&As (insignificant at year +1), they still achieve better results overall on long-term operating performance after transactions (ACFRpost is significantly different from zero at the 5% level). This result is consistent with that shareholder holds more than 50% of the voting shares, it not only dominates, but legally controls the firm (Becht and Roell 1999, Faccio and . Therefore, we set the third dummy variable (OWN50) at the 50% threshold to examine this specific ownership structure. The other Table 2>> 4. Empirical Results Panel C tests the result sensitivity to various windows (year -1 compared to year +1, +2, and +3) similar to Denis and Denis (1995) . Results are qualitatively similar to the conclusions in panel B. These measures form the base for further analysis. . For ownership variables, acquiring firms with a concentration ownership structure above the 10% threshold (OWN10) are dominant (86%) in our sample. La Porta et al. (1999) found 10% concentrated ownership in 89.26% of cases for medium-sized firms around the world. At a 20% cut off (OWN20), we found a 72% concentration that is also very close to the figure (70%) in the La Porta et al. (1999) research. Using 50% cut off (OWN50), 25% of cases in our sample are concentrated, compared to 11% in Yen and Andr´e (2007) sampled from English origin countries.
Operating Cash Flow Returns
<< Insert Table 3>>
Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Analysis
In addition, the median (mean) voting share of the largest shareholder (OWN) is 34.59%
(39.79%). The average ownership in La Porta et al. (1998) is 46% in the world, but they collected ownership stakes of the three largest shareholders in each sample firm. The univariate results
show that voting share percentage of the largest shareholder positively correlates with performance, but not significantly. The only group with significant outperformance in the post acquisition period is the acquiring firms with the largest shareholder stakes from 25% to 30% 5 We also ran regressions using these alternative measures, not reported, and results were quantitatively similar 
(OWN2530)
. We further present Panel B to confirm that firms with lower levels of concentration make poorer M&A decisions.
For governance variables, separation of voting and cash flow rights (SEP) is 13% of the sample. This ratio is not as high as expected for acquiring firms from emerging markets, but closer to that (15%) in Yen and Andr´e (2007) Companies with high anti-director rights indexes have a lower mean and median measure (0.80%, 0.34%) but companies with a high updated anti-director rights index have higher post-acquisition performance (2.39%, 1.32%), and the difference for both indexes is not significant.
Beyond the investors protection law (anti-director right), this study investigates law enforcement. Referring to Nenova (2003) , we mainly use the measure for rule of law (Enforce_ruleoflaw) from LLSV (1998) but in testing the alternative measures of law enforcement, the results are stable. In addition, we examine private enforcement (so called antiself-dealing) (ANTISDI) and public enforcement (PubEnforce_H) indexes in the DLLS (2006) working paper. The mean (median) score of the rule of law is 5.82 (5.51) for all countries in our sample and companies with stronger law enforcement have better performance measures. The acquiring firms in countries with higher scores (more than 0.5) of a public enforcement index are 14 51% in the sample 9 and do better than firms with a lower score. The correlation between the antiself-dealing index and post-adjusted cash flow returns is negative (-0.083). None of the relationships are significant.
To inspect legal protection effects, this study tested the quality of accounting standards (ACCOUNT), another proxy applied in LLSV (1998). We found that the mean (median) score of the accounting standard is 62.35 (61.00) for the sample countries and the accounting quality is negative, but the effect is economically trivial to post adjusted returns. While existing governance research focuses mostly on the function of legal institutions, the current work draws attention to the features of extra-legal institutions by analyzing a variable (XLegal) introduced in Dyck and
Zingales (Dyck-Zingales, 2004) However, compared to the 7% in Yen and Andr´e (2007) for English origin deals, we have comparable results. The mean (median) 4-week premium (Prem_4wks) is 21.79% (10.91%) overall. The average size (Size-rel) of targets is about 57% smaller than that of acquirers and the average level of acquirers' leverage (LEV) is relatively high (48%) for emerging market deals compared to 21.5%
in Maury (2005) for Western European firms and 16% in Yen and Andr´e (2007) for English origin deals.
Among the deal variables, only two variables have a significant relationship with post acquisition performance. Cross border transactions (Cross_Border) are statistically low in our study for emerging markets because acquirers might face obstacles that offset possible advantages 9 According to the public enforcement (PubEnforce_H) of DLLS (2006), countries with a high score (above median, i.e. 0.5 and 1) in our sample include Brazil, Chile, India, Malaysia, Mexico, and Russian Fed. We also tested each Dyck-Zingales extra-legal measure individually, and the results are basically consistent.
when entering new markets (Campa and Hernando 2004, André et al. 2004) . Related M&A (Industry_rel) is also documented with significantly poor performance in the long run. These findings are consistent with some studies which suggest that conglomerate mergers may raise entry barriers, reduce systematic risk, improve income stability, and lower capital costs (Lewellen 1971 , Scott 1989 , Limmack and McGregor 1995 , André et al. 2004 . In addition to these two factors, the other deal variables in this study have little influence on post-adjusted returns via univariate tests. Table 4>> 4.3 Regression Results Looking at ownership, acquiring firms with a large shareholder holding of more than 10% ownership (OWN10) outperform widely held firms (model 1). Likewise, the presence of a large shareholder holding more than 20% ownership (OWN20) significantly improves post performance by 6.7% (model 2). When we further separate firms with large shareholders over 20% ownership into two groups (between 20% and 50% (OWN2050) and more 50% (OWN50)), the OWN2050 group outperforms (model 3). Turning to the actual level of concentration, the linear model 12 (models 4) suggests that post performance increases by 3.9% for a one percent change in concentration (but not significantly). The results sustain no matter which group of legal variables is controlled (model 5 to 8). These findings verify the results in univariate tests and posit that after controlling for governance mechanisms and deal characteristics, value-creating deals associate with higher levels of concentration, especially between 20% and 50%, consistent with decreasing agency costs as the controlling shareholder's wealth invested in the acquiring firm increases. This evidence is not only for US family firms in Anderson and Reeb (2003) or bidders from English 11. While we do not present the correlation matrix, there was no serious level of correlation between variables (p ≦ 0.50, except Antidir_H and ANTISDI (0.705), ACCOUNT and ANTISDI (0.792) ). Further, the relative stability of results across various model specifications is another sign that multicollinearity is not a serious issue. 12 We also tested the non-linear relationship between ownership and post performance. However, the quadratic models and cubic models did not enhance the explanatory power of this set of data (adjusted R 2 decrease compared to model 4 and 8), so we do not show the results of these two models in table 5.
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origin countries in Yen and Andr´e (2007) , but also for acquiring companies from emerging markets in this study.
Looking at a broad set of governance variables, board composition has significant impact on firm performance for acquiring firms in emerging markets. First, board size (B_Size) positively relates to post performance. This result indicates larger boards are more likely to include various experts to compensate for managers' weakness (Agrawal and Chadha 2005) , but contradicts the potential inefficiency of larger boards suggested in prior literature (Jensen 1993 , Yermack 1996 , Conyon and Peck 1998 Second, this study questions the effectiveness of an audit committee (B_Audit according to the results. Earlier researchers have had similar concerns whether intense scrutiny surpasses the potential contribution of audit committees (Turpin and DeZoort 1998, Turley and Zaman 2004) and lack of expertise and experience in making important investment decisions (DeZoort 1997 , Hatherly 1999 , Cohen, Krishnamoorthy and Wright 2002 . Third, the proportion of independent (non-executive) directors on the board (INDDIR) has a positive association with post acquisition performance similar to a number of studies (Fama and Jensen 1983, Rosenstein and Wyatt 1990) .
Other variables such as separation, CEO position (CEO duality and related CEO), or other blockholders are not significant in explaining long-term M&A performance. Regarding deal characteristics, the entirely equity-financed M&As (Pay_Share) significantly under-performed in the long run. Confirming the signal effect of payment methods (Loughran and Vijh 1997 , André et al. 2004 , Faccio and Masulis 2005 . The toehold interests (Toehold) have slightly negative effects on post-adjusted performance at the 10 percent significance level. This result challenges the argument that pre-merger equity interests help bidders' shareholders to retain acquisition benefits (Franks and Harris 1989, Sudarsanam, Holl and Salami 1996) . The presence of multiple bidders (Compete) has a significant positive impact on acquiring performance. Similar to the view of Capron and Pistre (2002) , this positive competition effect provides a valuable point that if acquirers control unique resources, similar to most acquiring firms in emerging markets, they still can expect to earn abnormal returns. In addition, the larger bid premium 13 (Prem_4w) triggers a more negative acquiring performance (Goergen and Renneboog 2004, Healy, Palepu and Ruback 1997) and acquirers with a higher leverage ratio (LEV) will motivate managers to undertake value-enhancing M&A projects (Stulz 1990, Maloney, McCormick and Mitchell 1993) . Other variables such as targets' legal origin, cross border, transaction attitude, industry relatedness 14 , and size effect do not have significant impact in explaining the operating performance of acquiring firms in emerging markets.
<< Insert Table 5>>
Additional Analysis
Stemming from the classification of legal families (La Porta et al. 1998 Table 6 shows that acquiring firms from an English origin legal system (A_English) do not over or under-perform in the post acquisition period (model 9, positive but not significant).
However, an interesting finding is that after controlling firm-level governance mechanisms and possible deal effects, the acquiring firms from the German origin legal family (A_German) significantly increase their operating performance after acquisition (5.59%), whereas the acquiring firms from the French legal origin (A_French) report statistically poor performance at 13 We also conducted analysis using the premium of offer price to target trading price one day and one week prior to the original announcement date. Results, not reported, are quantitatively similar.
the p = 0.01 level (-6.26%). The control variables including governance and deal proxies show parallel results as in prior discussions.
<< Insert Table 5>>
Conclusions and Discussions
This paper determines the effect of ownership structure, governance mechanisms, and legal systems on long term operating performance of acquiring firms in emerging countries. The findings suggest a role for controlling shareholders (especially holding ownership between 25%-30%) in improving post acquisition operating performance over three years after transaction. Findings show no significant differences between acquiring firms with and without separation of ownership and voting rights. Among firm-level corporate governance mechanisms, boar composition indexes are stronger related to post acquisition performance than those of CEO position and block-holders. For country-level legal systems, value-creating deals associate with higher quality accounting standards and superior investor protection of emerging markets. The revised anti-director rights indices reported in DLLS (22006) could be a better measure of investor protection than the original anti-director right index in LLSV (1998). Further, too strong legal enforcement leads to greater value destruction.
Finally, legal origin has a varying influence on corporate performance but in contrast to earlier findings, this study does not detect greater corporate performance in emerging markets from English origin countries. Instead, we find acquiring firms from emerging countries classified as legal German origin are prominent above the other groups and detect poor performance in acquiring firms from emerging countries classified as legal French origin.
